Forecasting the Adoption of GM Oilseed Rape: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment by Breustedt, Gunnar et al.
  1 
AES, 82nd Annual Conference 2008, RAC Cirencester 
31st March to 2nd April 
 
 
Forecasting the Adoption of GM Oilseed Rape: Evidence from a Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
 
Gunnar Breustedt, Jörg Müller-Scheeßel and Uwe Latacz-Lohmann
1 
 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel  





This paper explores farmers’ willingness to adopt genetically modified oilseed rape prior to 
its commercial release and estimates the ‘demand’ for the new technology. The analysis is 
based upon choice experiments with 202 German arable farmers. A multinomial probit 
estimation revealed that GM attributes such as gross margin, expected liability from cross 
pollination, or flexibility in returning to conventional oilseed rape significantly affect the 
likelihood of adoption. Neighbouring farmers’ attitudes towards GM cropping and a 
number of farmer and farm characteristics were also found to be significant determinants 
of prospective adoption. Demand simulations suggest that adoption rates are very sensitive 
to the profit difference between GM and non-GM rape varieties. A monopolistic seed price 
would substantially reduce demand for the new technology. A monopolistic seed supplier 
would reap between 45 and 80 per cent of the GM rent, and the deadweight loss of the 
monopoly would range between 15 and 30 per cent of that rent. The remaining rent for 
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1  Introduction 
Although genetically modified (GM) oilseed rape is yet to be approved for field-scale 
cultivation in the EU, stakeholders are beginning to gear up for the commercial 
release of GM varieties. Plant breeders and their downstream agents must devise 
strategies to launch the new technology and to promote their new varieties. Policy 
makers face difficult choices as to how to deal with potential externalities from cross 
pollination: oilseed rape pollen can be dispersed over large distances by wind or 
insects, ‘contaminating’ non-GM rape varieties. Under current EU and national 
legislation, farmers can be held liable for damages arising from cross pollination 
(Beckmann et al., 2006). On the other hand, farmers can be expected to gain from the 
new technology, which offers higher gross margins than its conventional counterpart. 
Farmers may respond to the liability rules in a number of ways, for example, by 
concentrating GM varieties on adjacent plots or by coordinating the spatial pattern of 
GM cropping across different holdings so as to keep cross pollination to a minimum. 
In addition, the insurance sector may develop new products to underwrite the risks 
from cross pollination.  
This paper aims to contribute to the debate surrounding the pending launch of GM 
oilseed rape in Europe by  
exploring farmers’ willingness to adopt GM oilseed rape ex ante, i.e. prior to its 
commercial release and  
estimating the ‘demand’ for the new technology and ascertaining its key 
determinants.  
More specifically, we wish to:  
ascertain the characteristics of farmers who are likely to grow GM oilseed rape;  
investigate which attributes of GM oilseed rape impact upon farmers’ prospective 
adoption decisions; 
explore the role of framing effects on the likelihood of adoption; 
analyse the impact of a technology fee for GM on the demand for the new technology;  
explore the distribution of net gains from the new technology between a monopolistic 
GM seed industry and farmers.  
The analysis is based on a choice modelling case study with German arable farmers. 
In our choice experiment, farmers growing oilseed rape were presented with a series 
of choice sets containing two GM rape cropping options and a conventional oilseed 
rape alternative. Each of the alternatives was characterised by a number of 
attributes, including e.g. gross margin, likelihood of cross pollination, and 
neighbouring farmers’ attitudes towards GM cropping. From each choice set, 
respondents were asked to choose their preferred alternative. 
The article builds upon and extends earlier work by a subset of the authors 
(Breustedt et al., forthcoming). The remainder of the article is organised as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the literature on the use of choice experiments for assessing 
technology adoption in agriculture, focussing on GM technology adoption. Section 3 
describes the choice experiment and sets out the conceptual and empirical model. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Section 5 presents the conclusions.    3 
2  Choice experiments and GM technology adoption: a review of the 
literature 
Choice experiments have been used widely to estimate the value of non-market goods 
(e.g. Adamowicz et al., 1998; Mogas et al.,2006) or to explore the role of product 
attributes for consumer choice (e.g. Lusk, 2003; Lusk et al., 2003 for GM-related 
consumer choices). Applications of choice experiments to agricultural technology 
choices are rare, and the few applications that do exist have focused on GM 
technology adoption. One noteworthy exception is Windle and Rolfe’s (2005) analysis 
of enterprise diversification choices in Australian agriculture.  
Choice experiments pertaining to the adoption of competing technologies in 
agriculture are based on random utility theory. The random utility as a latent 
variable of two or more options is compared and it is assumed that the observed 
decision for one of the options implies a higher utility of the option chosen. The 
relevant analyses in the literature – two are ex post, i.e. the GM crop had already 
been launched, and two are ex ante – are based on dichotomous choice contingent 
valuation experiments. Hubbell et al. (2000) as well as Qaim and de Janvry (2003) 
analyse – based on revealed and stated preferences – the dichotomous choice between 
adoption and non-adoption of Bt Cotton in the United States and in Argentina, 
respectively. Bt cotton is genetically engineered to express a toxin which serves as a 
biological insecticide. In both studies, education and farm size are found to increase 
the farmers’ likelihood of choosing the Bt technology. In addition, willingness to pay 
(WTP) figures for Bt cotton seed are derived and average demand elasticities are 
estimated for both adopters and non-adopters. This was done by combining growers’ 
stated and revealed preferences for the Bt crop. While revealed preferences were 
derived from the observed technology choices at the market price, stated preferences 
were obtained from the dichotomous choice experiment. Non-adopters were asked 
whether they would grow Bt cotton for randomly chosen prices below the current 
market price.  
Kolady and Lesser (2006) as well as Krishna and Qaim (2007) conducted ex ante 
analyses of Bt eggplant adoption in India. Kolady and Lesser (2006) asked farmers 
their WTP for Bt and non-Bt eggplant varieties in two different ways, depending on 
the variety’s breeding method (hybrid or non-hybrid). The WTP for the Bt hybrid 
variety was elicited using a ‘modified’ double-bounded dichotomous choice 
experiment. First, each farmer was offered the Bt eggplant seed at a maximum price. 
If the farmer rejected, he was made one other offer at a randomly chosen lower price. 
By contrast, the WTP for the non-hybrid Bt (the so-called Bt open-pollinated) variety 
was evaluated with an open-ended question. Since Bt hybrid and Bt non-hybrid seed 
varieties were to be offered in parallel, Kolady and Lesser (2006) estimate the ex ante 
adoption decision for Bt varieties jointly with the observed decision to choose hybrid 
or non-hybrid eggplant seed in several model specifications. The model results 
suggest that a higher price of Bt seed reduces the probability of adoption only in the 
early years after the launch of the Bt varieties. In later years, the Bt seed price was no 
longer significant.  
Krishna and Qaim (2007) also used a double bounded dichotomous choice model 
(DBDCM). In their choice experiment, farmers were only offered Bt hybrids at a 
uniform price. If they rejected, the price was randomly lowered; if they accepted, the   4 
price level was randomly raised. Because Bt technology was to be launched 
sequentially – the hybrid varieties first, and the Bt open pollinated varieties (OPV) 
some years later– Krishna and Qaim (2007) analysed the adoption of Bt hybrids with 
the Bt OPV as an alternative Bt option in the choice set. In their choice experiment, 
they first described the advantages and disadvantages of both varieties. Respondents 
were then asked to choose among the three options 'Bt hybrid', 'Bt OPV' and 'no 
adoption'. The first bid from the DBDCM was used as the price for Bt hybrids. The 
Bt OPV was randomly assigned a price bid within a double bounded price corridor. 
Krishna and Qaim (2007) find that the average WTP for Bt hybrids is more than four 
times the current price of non-Bt hybrids. Their results also indicate that the launch 
of Bt OPV varieties would reduce the WTP for Bt hybrid by 35 per cent.  
The choice experiment underlying the present paper differs from the above studies in 
a number of ways. First, farmers in Hubbell et al.’s (2000), Qaim and de Janvry’s 
(2003), Kolady and Lesser’s (2006), and Krishna and Qaim’s (2007) experiments were 
only once confronted with the choice between one GM and a non-GM crop. 
Respondents in the present study were asked several times to choose between several 
(two) GM options and a non-GM alternative. We thus obtained more observations 
than there were respondents in the survey. In addition, our GM options do not only 
differ in the price of the technology but also in technology attributes such as liability 
for damages from cross pollination, flexibility in returning to conventional oilseed 
rape growing, and attitudes of neighbouring farmers towards GM cropping. These 
attributes are particularly important in studying the adoption of GM oilseed rape in 
the EU context: first, because the risk of unintended cross pollination is higher in 
oilseed rape than in cotton or eggplant production and, second, because adoption 
decisions are likely to be affected by framing effects. Such framing effects result from 
the emotional debate surrounding genetic modification in the EU. None of the studies 
reviewed above considers framing effects or technological externalities as potential 
determinants of adoption.  
3  Methodology 
3.1  The farm survey  
Since we aim to assess farmers’ adoption decisions in an ex ante setting, i.e. prior to 
commercial release of GM oilseed rape varieties, we cannot resort to market data or 
other secondary data. Our empirical analysis thus relies upon primary data from 
potential GM oilseed rape growers. The data were collected with the use of an online 
survey of arable farmers - all oilseed rape growers. The online questionnaire was 
generated with the help of survey design tools developed by Globalpark 
(www.globalpark.de) and was easily made available on the Department’s homepage. 
The survey was conducted in the spring of 2006. Farmers were invited to participate 
in the survey through adverts in agricultural magazines, online and offline 
newsletters, and online forums. The adverts outlined the purpose of the survey and 
displayed the web address where farmers could access further information and the 
questionnaires. The agricultural magazines reach the majority of German farmers. 
We counted 575 hits to the survey’s homepage. 127 of those interested quit the survey 
at the starting page, 255 completed the questionnaire. Of these 255 questionnaires, 
194 were suitable for inclusion in the subsequent data analysis. Farmers who   5 
preferred to participate in the survey offline were given a telephone number where 
they could request a hard copy of the questionnaire. This yielded another eight fully 
filled-in questionnaires. The total number of questionnaires included in the analysis 
thus was 202.  
In the questionnaire, the term GM was defined before farmers were first asked about 
their oilseed rape acreage and their key farming activities and enterprises. We then 
explained the choice sets, the meaning of the different attributes, and real-world rules 
for growing GM oilseed rape. The questionnaire confronted respondents with choice 
sets. Each choice set consisted of two GM oilseed rape options and one conventional 
oilseed rape alternative. Respondents were asked to choose their most preferred 
option. To keep things easy, we asked respondents to select exactly one out of the 
three cropping alternatives for their entire oilseed rape acreage. Table 1 exemplifies a 
choice set. Each of the GM cropping options is characterised by a set of six attributes, 
with varying attribute levels. The attribute levels for the GM options are expressed 
relative to the non-GM oilseed rape counterfactual. The attributes are:  
difference in gross margin per hectare between GM and non-GM oilseed rape,  
probability of being held liable for damages from cross pollination, 
level of cross pollination damage, 
waiting period, i.e. time elapsed before non-GM oilseed rape can be grown on GM 
plots without secondary growth of GM varieties, 
increased time window for the first herbicide application in GM oilseed rape crops,  
neighbouring farmers’ attitudes towards GM oilseed rape growing. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 displays the levels chosen for each attribute. The SPSS software package was 
used to generate the choice sets. This yielded 27 choice sets out of all possible 
combinations representing a balanced, (perfectly) orthogonal, fractional-factorial 
design for the experiment. We excluded one choice set where both GM options were 
identical. Two further choice sets were eliminated because in each set one GM option 
clearly dominated the other. In both choice sets the waiting period (time window) was 
shorter (longer) for one GM option while the remaining attributes were the same. 
Following Hensher and Bradley (1993), such options do not contribute useful 
information. However, the remaining 24 choice sets did not represent a perfectly 
orthogonal design because its so-called D-efficiency is 2.3 below the optimal value of 
100 for a balanced orthogonal design.
1 Each questionnaire contained eight choice sets.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Attribute levels were chosen with reference to available data. Higher gross margins 
(+40%) for GM canola in Canada due to reduced herbicide (-61%), fuel (-14%) and 
higher seed costs (+53%) are reported by the Canola Council of Canada (2001), based 
on farm surveys. The probability and level of damage result from the fact that oilseed 
rape is predominantly a cross pollinating plant whose pollen can be dispersed up to 3 
                                                 
1 Maximising the D-efficiency criterion is similar to minimising the variance of coefficient estimates in a 
linear model, or the inverse of the information matrix, (X’X)
-1 (Kuhfeld et al., 1994). Our value of 97.7 for 
the 24 choice sets is close to optimum. Lusk et al. (2003) use a survey design consisting of three three-level 
and two two-level attributes with a D-efficiency of 97.    6 
kilometres by wind or insects (e.g. Timmons, 1995; Rieger et al., 2002). Cross 
pollination can result in economic damage if the ‘contaminated’ rape sells at a lower 
price than pure non-GM rape. Under EU and national legislation, European farmers 
can be held liable for damage arising from GM ‘contamination’ (Beckmann et al., 
2006). ‘Contamination’ can also occur through secondary growth of GM oilseed rape 
in a conventional rape crop (Momoh et al., 2002), implying that growers of GM rape 
cannot easily revert to conventional oilseed rape cropping. The GenEERA (2007) 
webpage reports waiting periods of eight to ten years before non-GM rape can be 
grown without ‘contamination’. Herbicides can be applied over a longer period in a 
GM rape crop than in a non-GM crop, increasing a farmer’s operational flexibility. 
Since the debate in Germany surrounding genetic modification has been controversial 
and even the farming community does not appear to have reached consensus over the 
issue, we were interested in exploring whether farmers’ willingness to grow GM 
oilseed rape was affected by their neighbouring peers’ attitudes towards GM 
cropping. This was done by including an appropriate attitudes variable in the choice 
sets.  
3.2  The Choice Model 
As in Hubbell et al. (2000), Qaim and de Janvry (2003), Kolady and Lesser (2006), 
and Krishna and Qaim (2007) we base our modelling approach on Lancaster’s 
characteristics theory of value. Previous work on GM adoption has focused on binary 
choices: farmers had to choose either one option out of two or had to make two 
choices between two options each. By contrast, our respondents had to choose one 
option out of three. Put differently, while previous analyses focus on (multivariate) 
binary choices our approach is multinomial. A farmer’s utility resulting from his or 
her cropping decision depends upon several attributes associated with the cropping 
alternatives. Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1994) we define a random utility 
function which consists of a deterministic (V
*
ij) and a stochastic (
ε *
ij) component as: 
(1) 
* * *
ij ij ij U V e = +  
where U
*
ij is ith farmer’s utility from choosing alternative j, V
*
ij is the systematic 
portion of utility determined by the attribute levels of alternative j given farmer i’s 
characteristics, and 
ε *
ij is an error term with zero mean. The systematic portion of 
utility can be expressed as:  
(2) 
* * * * * * *






ija is the ath attribute of alternative j for farmer i, and zim is the mth personal 
characteristic of farmer i, and the 
β s and 
α
*s are the coefficients to be estimated, 
while the variables in bold represent appropriately dimensioned vectors. The 
β s were 
constrained not to vary among the alternatives for reasons explained below. 
Although in our choice experiment (CE), each respondent made several choices 
among alternative cropping options, the following exposition refers, for simplicity, to 
only one choice decision. Since utility cannot be observed we turn to the probability 
that alternative k is chosen by farmer i in preference to any alternative j ≠ k as per 
(3):  
(3)  { }
* * Prob ; for all  ik ij i U U j ³ ÎW    7 
where 
  i is the choice set for farmer i, that is 
  i = {Option A (GM oilseed rape I), 
Option B (conventional oilseed rape), Option C (GM oilseed rape II)}. 
We apply a multinomial probit model which assumes a multivariate normal 
distribution of the error terms among alternatives.
2 The error terms for each 
alternative have an expected value of zero and can be correlated among alternatives. 
However, since neither the location nor the scale of random utility is relevant for the 
inequalities in (3), restrictions must be imposed to ensure identification of model 
parameters. Location is normalised for by taking the difference between the utility of 
one alternative and the utilities of the remaining alternatives. In our case, Option B 
(conventional oilseed rape) is chosen as the natural reference for normalisation, i.e. 
k = B and j Î Î Î Î {A, C}. Thus, we define differences in utility 
* *
ij ij iB U U U = -  and 
* *
ij ij iB V V V = -  as well as errors 
* *
ij ij iB e e e = - . To normalise for scale, we set the variance 
of 
ε
iA (= the difference of the error term of the first GM option (Option A) minus the 
error term of Option B) to one.  
From this follows  
(4)  ( ) ( )
* * * *







α A = 
α C = 
α , implying that a farmer’s characteristics is assumed to have the 
same impact on his utility difference between each of the GM options and the 
conventional oilseed rape alternative. Having expressed all attributes in relation to 
the conventional oilseed rape alternative and having constructed the experiment such 
that there are no other (unobserved) differences between the GM options, the impact 
of a change in the level of an attribute on the adoption probability does not vary 
between the two GM alternatives. For this reason, we have constrained the 
coefficients not to vary between GM alternatives, as indicated above.  
Because of the Multinomial Probit we define  
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where 
σ iC is the variance of 
ε iC and 
σ iAiC is the covariance between 
ε iA and 
ε iC. 
From (3) follows the probability that Option B is chosen (ProbB) (see for example 
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with  bi f  representing the density function for a bivariate normal distribution. To 
solve for 
Σ , a and 
β  (including a constant which accounts for unobserved differences 
in utility between GM and non-GM cropping option), simulation or numerical 
                                                 
2 We do not apply a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) which assumes, among other things, independently 
distributed error terms among choice alternatives. A Hausman Test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) rejected 
the assumption of independently distributed error terms for our data sets.    8 
integration procedures have to be applied. We estimate the model using the 
asmprobit-routine in Stata 9.2 which applies a simulated log-likelihood function to 
(5). 
For estimating the sample marginal effects for the probability of choosing a GM 
alternative ProbGM, we simulate the negative change in the probability of choosing 
the conventional oilseed rape option ProbB  (see (6)) when varying an exogenous 
variable x. The marginal effects across the sample of I respondents with Ni 
observations each are:  
(6) 
B






















4  Results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample of 202 respondents. The 
average age of respondents is 43, nearly half of them have a college or university 
degree, 41 per cent of respondents have children aged 16 or below; only three per 
cent of respondents are female. The distribution of farm acreage is skewed to the 
right, with a mean of 315 hectares and a median of 123 hectares. The average oilseed 
rape share is 18 per cent. Although the regional distribution of respondents 
corresponds well with the regional distribution of the oilseed rape acreage in 
Germany the median farm size is around twice the German average full-time farm 
(Agrarbericht 2007).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
A total of 1577 choice sets were included in the estimation. Each choice set contained 
two GM options, hence n = 3154. Some farmers made fewer than eight choices. To 
ease interpretation, we have condensed the probability and the level of damage into 
one variable: ‘expected liability’, implying the assumption of farmers being risk 
neutral. Conducting the estimations with both variables, i.e. level and probability of 
damage, instead of ‘expected liability’ did not change the significance of any 
estimation parameter when both variables are significant.
3 Furthermore, we 
modelled neighbours’ attitudes towards GM cropping with the use of two dummy 
variables, one for ‘GM hostile neighbours’ and one for ‘GM friendly neighbours’. 
The dummy variables assume a value of zero if neighbours’ attitudes are neutral and 
a value of one if they are GM hostile or GM friendly, respectively. 
 
                                                 
3 Estimations results for this specification, which is not an expected utility model, can be obtained from the 
authors upon request.   9 
4.2  Estimation Results 
We estimate multinomial probit (MNP) models as outlined in section 3.2. Since 50 per 
cent of respondents did not choose a GM alternative at least once from their eight 
choice sets, we conduct the estimations separately for the whole sample of 
respondents and the subset of respondents who did choose GM alternatives. In the 
whole sample, 35 per cent of the choices are in favour of GM options. In the 
remainder of the article, we shall refer to the two samples as the ‘whole sample’ and 
the ‘GM farmer sample’, respectively. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results for the two samples. All estimations are highly 
significant. In the whole sample estimations (Table 4), all variables but four (‘time 
window’, ‘image’, ‘one plot’ and the constant) are significant at an error probability 
of 10 per cent or less. In addition, following an LR test the dummy variable ‘arable 
crops’ and the ‘oilseed rape share (region)’ were omitted from the estimation. The 




Tables 4 and 5 about here 
 
All of the GM crop attributes except ‘time window’ as well as farm characteristics 
such as farm size, existence of a successor, presence of children, and academic 
education are significant in the parsimonious estimation for the GM farmer sample 
and affect the probability of choosing GM in the expected direction (see Table 5). A 
lower gross margin, a longer waiting period to return to non-GM rape as well as GM 
hostile neighbours tend to decrease the utility of growing GM oilseed rape and thus 
reduce the willingness to adopt GM. The opposite is true for a smaller expected 
liability, GM friendly neighbours, and larger farm size.  
The farm type variables ‘bovine’, ‘pigs’, and ‘poultry’ are significant in both samples, 
while  ‘image’  and  ‘arable  crops’  are  significant  only  in  the  GM  sample.  One  might 
hypothesise that farmers in such sectors as pig, poultry, direct selling and farm holidays are 
more innovative than farmers in the heavily policy-influenced milk, beef and arable crops 
sectors. The above variables may thus be interpreted as proxies for a farmer’s propensity to 
adopt innovations. The estimated signs of these variables appear to support this conjecture. 
On the other hand, the strong positive impact of the ‘image’ variable representing direct 
selling activities and farm holidays appears to be somewhat out of step with the strong 
public opinion against GM food in Germany: growing GM varieties may spoil the image of 
farmers with direct selling and farm holiday activities. Farm size also has a positive impact 
on the adoption probability, confirming findings by Hubbell et al. (2000) and Qaim and de 
Janvry (2003).  
                                                 
4 We found slight multicollinearity among ‘oilseed rape share (farm)’, ‘oilseed rape  share (region)’, and 
‘arable crops’. However, inclusion of the last two variables in the parsimonious estimation does not cause 
any considerable changes in the estimation results.    10 
Our results are also consistent with ex post adoption studies by Fernandez-Cornejo and 
McBride (2002) and Marra et al. (2001). The former found a positive impact of farmers’ 
education as well as farm size on Bt and herbicide tolerant corn adoption in the US. Marra 
et al.’s (2001) study revealed a positive influence of education and farm profit on Bt cotton 
adoption in US.  By contrast, Weaver’s (2005)  analysis of the determinants of  ex post 
adoption of transgenic soybeans in the US revealed a negative influence of education on 
adoption decisions. The share of income from cotton production was found not to have an 
impact on Bt cotton adoption Marra et al.’s (2001) study. This is contrary to our finding 
that a farm’s oilseed rape share exerts negative influence on adoption probabilities – a 
somewhat unexpected result. Since one would expect fixed costs of adoption (e.g. seeking 
of information, learning) to decline with the GM rape share, an increase in that share 
should make GM oilseed rape more attractive. The negative impact may be explained by 
farmers’ risk considerations: a greater share of the new technology implies greater risk. 
Hubbell et al. (2000) report similar effects of the income share of the potential GM crop on 
the acreage of GM adoption.  
A key difference in estimation results between the two samples is the impact of the 
variables ‘age’, ‘sex’ (0 = male, 1 = female), and ‘close to city’. These exert a negative 
impact on the likelihood of GM adoption in the whole sample estimations, while they 
are not significant in the GM farmer estimations. We interpret this result to imply 
that these variables explain whether or not a farmer dismisses GM categorically. 
However, they cannot explain how many times a non-dismissive farmer chooses a GM 
alternative out of the eight choice sets. The higher absolute impact of the ‘children’ 
variable in the whole sample compared to the GM sample estimations (see Table 5) 
may be explained along similar lines. However, the ‘children’ variable is significant in 
both samples, indicating that the presence of children on a farm has an impact on 
both the general willingness to adopt GM oilseed rape and on the frequency of 
adoption. The constant being significant in the GM sample (Table 5) indicates that 
there are more determinants of GM adoption than were included in the regressions. 
Previous analyses of GM technology adoption, which have focused on developing 
countries, have neither found any significant impact of farmer’s age, nor have they 
considered the presence of children, farmer’s sex, or proximity to a city as potential 
determinants of adoption.  
The effects of the variables ‘gross margin’ and ‘expected liability’ are all significant 
and their signs support literature results: Hubbell et al. (2000), Qaim and de Janvry 
(2003), and Kolady and Lesser (2006) found that a technology fee and farmers’ price 
bids for GM exert a significantly negative impact on the willingness to adopt GM 
cropping alternatives. The same authors also report that higher levels of education 
increase the willingness to pay for GM or to adopt GM technology.  
Table 6 reports the sample marginal effects for the probability of choosing a GM 
alternative as per expression (7). The value of 3.08 for the gross margin means that a 
€10 per hectare increase in the gross margin difference increases the likelihood of   11 
choosing GM cropping options by 3.08 per cent points. As is clear from Table 6, these 
effects differ between samples. As one would expect, the ‘GM farmers’ respond more 
strongly to changes in the attribute levels (see right-hand column in Table 6) than the 
average farmer in the sample.  
It is noteworthy that, in both samples, the marginal effect of a change in the gross 
margin difference is greater than that of a change in expected liability from cross 
pollination. From this we draw the tentative conclusion that our survey farmers did 
not appear to have reacted in a risk-averse manner to the challenge of cross 
pollination. This appears plausible in that oilseed rape production only accounts for a 
limited portion of a farm’s economic activities and because we control for the effect of 
farm size and oilseed rape share in the farm rotation. Furthermore, Table 6 shows 
that the reduction in the probability of choosing GM oilseed rape due to a €10 per 
hectare insurance premium (= €10/ha lower gross margin) is not compensated for by 
the respective probability increase from a €10/ha reduction in expected liability. 
Thus, the monetary gain resulting from insurance against liability will not be 
sufficient to cover an insurance company’s transaction costs and profit. 
Consequently, in our experiment an economically sustainable insurance against 
damages from cross pollination would not increase demand for GM oilseed rape. 
Of the remaining variables in the whole sample estimations, the differential impact of 
neighbours’ attitudes towards GM is particularly noteworthy. It is clear from Table 7 that 
the demand effect of ‘GM hostile neighbours’ is three times greater than that of ‘GM 
friendly  neighbours’,  both  compared  to  neighbours  with  neutral  attitudes  towards  GM 
cropping. Roughly speaking, in the GM farmer sample the demand effect of ‘GM hostile 
neighbours’ outweighs a €20 per hectare increase in the gross margin difference. Likewise, 
an extension of the waiting period by one year outweighs a €5/ha higher gross margin.  
 
Table 6 about here 
4.3  Demand simulations 
The econometric results enable us to simulate the demand for GM oilseed rape 
cropping under a set of assumptions relating to the attributes of the GM options and 
farmer characteristics. We use two alternative measures of demand. First, we 
measure demand by aggregating the hectares of oilseed rape grown across all 
respondents willing to adopt GM varieties. Second, we measure demand by the 
number of respondents willing to adopt GM oilseed rape assuming that every farmer 
grows the same area of oilseed rape, say, one hectare. The latter metric is used to 
mitigate the impact of very large individual oilseed rape acreages on aggregate 
demand.  
The analysis in this section comprises three steps: we first compute, based on the 
estimation results in section 4.2, a demand curve for the GM technology which 
reflects respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP). We then use the demand curve to 
derive a monopolistic technology fee. We finally assess the distribution of rents 
between a monopolistic technology provider (GM seed supplier) and farmers and 
compute the deadweight loss resulting from the monopoly.    12 
In order to derive demand curves we need a willingness-to-pay measure for each 
farmer, WTPi. This measure is constructed as follows. We first assume a general 
profit difference ∆ which is given exogenously and is assumed equal for all farmers. ∆ 
represents the gross margin difference (net of any technology fee) between GM and 
conventional oilseed rape varieties, minus expected liability. ∆ does not include any 
technology fee for reasons explained below.
5 From this profit difference we then 
deduct an amount of money representing the disutility facing a farmer from growing 
GM oilseed rape. This disutility arises from the waiting period, GM hostile 
neighbours etc and can be interpreted as a reservation profit difference, RPDi. In 
other words, RPDi is the amount of money that exactly compensates a farmer for this 
disutility. An individual farmer’s WTP thus is defined as WTPi = ∆ – RPDi. If RPDi = 
∆, farmer i will be indifferent between growing conventional and GM oilseed rape.  
RPDi is computed such that  0 ) , , ˆ ( ˆ = i i GM i RPD x V b , where  ˆ
iGM V  represents the 
estimated difference in utility between a GM option and the non-GM alternative as 
per equation (4), and xi represents both a farmer’s personal characteristics and the 
GM attribute levels except gross margin difference and expected liability. We use the 
coefficients of the parsimonious MNP model for the whole sample, ˆ b , and assume 
that gross margin has the same absolute effect on the likelihood of adoption as has 
expected liability. We thus use the coefficient for gross margin (0.0135 in Table 4) as 
the coefficient for ∆. We further set the ‘waiting period’ variable to eight years and 
assume GM hostile neighbours. Assuming risk neutrality, we can now compute RPDi 
and thus WTPi.  
The omission of the technology fee from the definition of ∆ in the above exposition 
demands an explanation. While this omission does not conform to the standard 
definition of the term ‘profit’, the WTP we wish to compute is to be interpreted as the 
maximum technology fee a farmer is willing to pay to obtain the GM technology.  
Figure 1 displays demand curves for GM oilseed rape for profit differences ∆ of €200, 
€100, and €50 per hectare, respectively. Demand is measured along the horizontal 
axis in terms of the hectares of land devoted to GM oilseed rape. For example, at a 
profit difference of €100/ha and a technology fee of €50 per hectare, approximately 
4,000 ha would be devoted to GM oilseed rape.  
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the demand simulations in greater detail. The 
simulations were carried out for six scenarios, each representing an alternative 
combination of the two measures of demand (based on individual and identical 
oilseed rape acreages) and the three assumed profit differences (€50, €100, €200 per 
hectare). The columns labelled ‘technology fee = 0‘ assume that farmers do not have 
to pay a higher price for GM seed. At a profit difference of €100/ha, this would result 
in 36 farmers adopting the technology, with 7,100 hectares of GM oilseed rape being 
grown. To put this number into context, note that all farmers included in the 
simulations grow a total of 12,449 hectares of oilseed rape. The GM rents reported in 
                                                 
5 However, ∆ may include differences in seed costs resulting from different seed production costs.    13 
the column labelled ’technology fee = 0‘ (Table 7) are represented by the areas under 
the respective demand curves in Figure 1. For a €100 per hectare profit difference, 
for example, the utility gain measured in monetary terms is €440,000 in total for 36 
farmers adopting 7,100 hectares of GM oilseed rape.  
It seems unrealistic, however, to assume that GM plant breeders would sell GM seed 
at the price of conventional seed. Especially if there are approved GM varieties of 
only one seed supplier on the market, the technology fee may reflect monopolistic 
pricing behaviour. This raises a number of questions: what is the monopolistic 
technology fee, how would it affect demand for the GM technology, and how would 
the GM rent be split between a monopolistic seed supplier and farmers? We utilised 
the demand curves of Figure 1 to determine profit-maximising technology fees for 
each of the six scenarios.
6 According to Table 7, the monopoly price is €61 per hectare 
in scenario II and €49.99 per hectare in scenario III.
7  
It is clear from Table 7 that the demand for the new technology is very sensitive to the 
technology fee: both the number of adopters and the GM rape acreage would decline 
substantially if a seed company were to impose a monopolistic technology fee. 
According to our simulations, between 46 and 78 per cent of the GM rent would 
accrue to a monopolistic GM seed supplier; the deadweight loss of the monopoly 
would range between 14 and 32 per cent, depending on the scenario. Consequently, 
farmers’ share of the GM rent would be small as would be the absolute adopters’ rent 
relative to the total oilseed rape area. This raises the question as to whether farmers 
would actually gain from the approval of GM oilseed rape for commercial cultivation.  
For the farming sector as a whole to benefit from the approval of GM rape varieties, the 
costs of ensuring coexistence incurred by farmers would have to remain below adopters’ 
rents.  Although  the  survey  implicitly  assumed  away  the  existence  of  direct  on-farm 
segregation  costs (by  assuming that  a farmer would either  adopt GM varieties for the 
whole on-farm rapeseed acreage or not adopt at all), segregation costs further down the 
supply chain may result in discounted producer prices. For GM rape to remain financially 
attractive in scenario II (€100 per hectare profit difference), this price discount would have 
to remain below one per cent of the current oilseed rape price.
8  
We emphasise that this conclusion is contingent upon the assumption of monopolistic price 
setting behaviour and that it is sensitive to the levels of the GM attributes assumed in the 
survey. The reader should further note that the sample of respondents is not representative 
of the German arable farming sector, with a median farm size of around twice the German 
                                                 
6 The assumptions needed for computing profit-maximising technology fees are that the GM seed supplier 
also sells conventional seed (but at a competitive price) and faces no difference in marginal production costs 
between conventional and GM seed.  
7 The monopoly price in scenario IV (€54 per hectare) is less than in scenario V (€61 per hectare) because the 
demand in the latter scenario is less elastic in the range of €80 to €40 per hectare. In scenario V only 9 
adopters exhibit a willingness to pay in this range while there are 68 in scenario IV. 
8 In scenario II, total adopters’ rent is roughly 114,000 € or approximately €2.30 per tonne (assuming a yield 
of 4 tonnes per hectare on 12,449 hectares). This is less than one per cent of the current oilseed rape price of 
approximately €280 per tonne.    14 
average arable farm. Results cannot therefore be extrapolated to estimate demand curves 
for Germany as a whole. Criticism may also be levelled at the assumption of uniform profit 
differences ∆. As highlighted by one of the reviewers, it may be more realistic to assume 
that ∆ varies among farmers who may have experienced different levels of weed infestation 
in  the  past  –  a  variable  that  had  not  been  elicited  in  the  survey.  We  argue  that  the 
assumption of uniform profit differences will indeed affect WTP figures for individual 
farmers,  but  will  leave  aggregate  demand  estimates  largely  unchanged:  some  farmers 
(those with a high PD) will display a higher WTP, while other farmers (those with a low 
PD) will be willing to pay less. On aggregate, the effects are likely to counterbalance each 
other.  
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper has explored farmers’ willingness to adopt GM oilseed rape prior to its 
commercial release and has estimated the ‘demand’ for the new technology. The 
analysis is based upon choice experiments with German farmers where respondents 
were asked to choose between two oilseed rape options and a conventional rape 
alternative. The data were collected through a combination of an online survey and 
paper-based questionnaires. The sample comprises 202 respondents who between 
them grow 12,449 hectares of oilseed rape, representing 1.2 per cent of Germany’s 
oilseed rape area. A multinominal probit model was employed to estimate the impact 
of GM rape attributes and farmers’ characteristics on the likelihood of GM rape 
adoption. These results were then used to estimate the ‘demand’ for the new 
technology under six alternative scenarios and to analyse how GM rents would be 
split between a monopolistic GM seed supplier and oilseed rape growers.  
We find that ex ante GM adoption decisions are driven by profit expectations, 
framing effects, and personal as well as farm characteristics. Monetary determinants 
such as the difference in gross margin between GM and non-GM oilseed rape 
varieties, expected liability from cross pollination and restricted flexibility in 
returning to conventional oilseed rape growing affect the willingness to adopt GM 
rape in the expected directions. Female farmers, older farmers, farmers with children 
aged 16 and below, and farmers living in the vicinity of a city are significantly less 
likely to adopt GM oilseed rape than farmers who do not display these 
characteristics. Farm size, secure farm succession and a college or university degree 
have a opposite effect on adoption probabilities. The variables age, sex and proximity 
to a city only explain whether a farmer dismisses GM categorically; they cannot 
explain how many times a non-dismissive farmer chooses a GM alternative out of the 
eight choice sets. Compared to GM neutral neighbours, farmers with neighbours who 
are hostile to GM cropping are significantly less likely to adopt GM oilseed rape, 
while the impact of consenting farmers is positive but much less pronounced. The 
large negative influence of the “GM hostile neighbour” variable indicates that   15 
neighbourhood effects and public attitudes matter a lot, such that individual farmers 
are not entirely free in their technology choice.  
For our simple distribution of cross pollination damages, farmers seem to act as risk-
neutral adopters of GM oilseed rape. Thus, insurance against cross pollination, which 
reduces the variability of profits from GM cropping, would be unlikely to have a 
positive effect on adoption rates. However, in our experimental setting respondents 
knew the distribution of damages. This may not be the case in real-world settings 
with complex liability rules. Liability rules should thus be kept clear and simple so as 
to allow farmers to forecast potential liability claims with some degree of accuracy, 
thereby mitigating the riskiness of GM cropping. Insurance solutions may also have a 
role to play in this respect.  
According to our demand simulations, a monopolistic seed price would be set at 
between €40 and €100 per hectare. This would result on average in over 50 per cent of 
the GM rent accruing to a monopolistic GM seed supplier and a deadweight loss of 
up to 32 per cent of the total benefit from growing GM oilseed rape. As a 
consequence, farmers’ share of the GM rent would remain small, and it is unclear 
whether adopters’ rents would be sufficiently high to outweigh possible producer 
price discounts resulting from downstream segregation costs. Given the assumptions 
made, the results thus raise doubts as to whether German rape growing farmers 
would actually benefit from the approval of herbicide-tolerant GM rape if the profit 
difference were less than €100 per hectare.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Sample choice set  
Which oilseed rape cropping alternative would you choose for your whole oilseed rape area? 
(Choose Option A, Option B, or Option C by checking the appropriate box) 
 





Option C  
(GM oilseed 
rape) 
Difference in gross 
margin  + €100/ha  + €100/ha 
Probability of being 
held liable for damage  40%  0% 
Level of damage  €50/ha  €50/ha 
Waiting period   10 years  12 years 
Longer time window 
for herbicide 
applications  
45 days  35 days 
Neighbouring farmers’ 
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Table 2. Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiment 
Attributes  Attribute levels  Description  Regression variable 




Difference in gross margins between 





Probability of being held liable for 





Damage caused by cross pollination of 






Time elapsed between last year of GM 
cropping and first year of non-GM 
cropping (years) 
waiting period 





Extended period for the first herbicide 
application compared to conventional 
oilseed rape (days) 
time window 
GM hostile neighbours  Neighbour’s attitude 




Neighbouring farmers’ attitudes 
towards GM cropping  GM friendly neighbours 
   20 
Table 3. Summary statistics of survey respondents, n = 202 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Explanation 
age  42.9  11.1  farmer’s age (years) 
farm acreage  315  534  hectares of arable land on farm 
oilseed rape share (farm)  0.18  0.09  share of oilseed rape in the farm’s rotation  
oilseed rape share (region)  0.08  0.046  share of oilseed rape in the region 
       
Dummy-Variables  Proportion of affirmative responses   Explanation 
one plot  42%  contiguous farm 
barriers  7%  plots are surrounded by (natural) barriers mitigating 
dispersion of pollen 
successor  41%  farmer has a successor  
children  41%  children aged 16 and below on the farm 
bovine  39%  farm with cattle as major enterprises  
pigs/poultry  26%  farm with pigs or poultry as major enterprises  
arable crops  93%  farm specialising in arable production  
image  10%  farm  with  agro-tourism  or  direct  selling  as  major 
enterprises  
sex  3%  female farmer 
education  46%  farmer with a college or university degree 
close to city  14%  farm located near a city > 500,000 population  
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Table 4. Determinants of GM oilseed rape adoption for the whole sample  
n = 4731  unrestricted estimation  parsimonious estimation 
log of simulated 
likelihood  -1193.0  -1196.3 
   coefficient  standard error  prob > |z|  coefficient  standard error  prob > |z| 
             
gross margin  0.014  0.0022  0.00  0.0135  0.0022  0.00 
expected liability  -0.013  0.0023  0.00  -0.0122  0.0022  0.00 
waiting period  -0.059  0.020  0.00  -0.059  0.020  0.00 
time window  -0.0022  0.0035  0.54       
GM hostile neighbours  -0.328  0.085  0.00  -0.320  0.084  0.00 
GM friendly neighbours  0.128  0.070  0.07  0.125  0.069  0.07 
             
farm size  0.0012  0.00014  0.00  0.001  0.0001  0.00 
oilseed rape share (farm)   -1.714  0.626  0.01  -1.901  0.615  0.00 
bovine  -0.505  0.117  0.00  -0.487  0.113  0.00 
pigs, poultry  0.330  0.121  0.01  0.334  0.120  0.01 
arable crops  -0.348  0.207  0.09       
image  0.012  0.175  0.94       
one plot  0.099  0.120  0.41       
barriers  0.626  0.205  0.00  0.572  0.194  0.00 
successor  0.275  0.122  0.02  0.270  0.121  0.03 
age  -0.014  0.0055  0.01  -0.013  0.005  0.02 
children  -0.496  0.108  0.00  -0.522  0.106  0.00 
sex  -0.638  0.310  0.04  -0.653  0.302  0.03 
education  0.348  0.111  0.00  0.329  0.108  0.00 
oilseed rape share 
(region)  -2.332  1.326  0.08       
close to city  -0.429  0.149  0.00  -0.364  0.146  0.01 
constant  0.22  0.442  0.62  -0.318  0.364  0.38 
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Table 5. Determinants of GM oilseed rape adoption for the GM farmer sample  
n = 2343  unrestricted estimation  parsimonious estimation 
log of simulated 
likelihood  -640.1  -642.8 
   coefficient  standard error  prob > |z|  coefficient  standard error  prob > |z| 
             
gross margin  0.032  0.0035  0.00  0.0316  0.0035  0.00 
expected liability  -0.030  0.0039  0.00  -0.0294  0.0039  0.00 
waiting period  -0.156  0.040  0.00  -0.154  0.040  0.00 
time window  -0.00265  0.0070  0.71       
GM hostile neighbours  -0.758  0.161  0.00  -0.750  0.160  0.00 
GM friendly neighbours  0.221  0.141  0.12  0.214  0.139  0.12 
             
farm size  0.0003  0.0002  0.05  0.0003  0.0002  0.04 
oilseed rape share (farm)   -2.62  1.16  0.02  -3.01  1.09  0.01 
bovine  -0.451  0.185  0.02  -0.527  0.180  0.00 
pigs, poultry  0.801  0.236  0.00  0.868  0.206  0.00 
arable crops  -2.39  0.560  0,00  -2.42  0.545  0.00 
image  1.287  0.365  0.00  1.25  0.35  0.00 
one plot  0.107  0.196  0.59       
barriers  0.306  0.354  0.39       
successor  0.618  0.231  0.01  0.666  0.178  0.00 
age  0.00549  0.0097  0.57       
children  0.433  0.185  0.02  0.416  0.175  0.02 
sex  -0.698  0.702  0.32       
education  0.583  0.186  0.00  0.527  0.173  0.00 
oilseed rape share 
(region)  -3.15  2.20  0.15       
close to city  -0.207  0.255  0.41       
constant  2.30  0.873  0.01  2.38  0.728  0.00 
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Table 6. Marginal effects on the probability of adoption (from parsimonious estimations) 
Variable  Change 
marginal effect  
(per cent points); 
whole sample 
marginal effect  
(per cent points);  
GM farmer sample 
gross margin  + €10/ha  3.08  5.22 
expected liability  + €10/ha  -2.78  -4.86 
waiting period  + 1 year  -1.31  -2.74 
GM hostile neighbours  + 1 if x = 0 (neutral)  -5.08  -9.64 
GM friendly neighbours  + 1 if x = 0 (neutral)  1.76  2.32 
farm size  + 100 ha  2.51  0.57 
oilseed rape share (farm)  + 0.03  -1.27  -1.59 
bovine  + 1 if x = 0  -6.68  -5.94 
pigs, poultry  + 1 if x = 0  5.62  10.3 
image  + 1 if x = 0  not significant  16.1 
arable crops  + 1 if x = 0  not significant  -1.99 
barriers  + 1 if x = 0  12.5  not significant 
successor  + 1 if x = 0  3.72  6.88 
age  + 3 years  -0.84  not significant 
children  + 1 if x = 0  -6.86  -4.13 
sex  + 1 if x = 0 (female)  -13.0  not significant 
education  + 1 if x = 0  4.09  4.87 
close to city  + 1 if x = 0  -6.72  not significant   24
Table 7. Demand simulations  










*  adopters   




adopters    GM fee  adopters' rent  dead weight 
loss 
     €/ha     €  # (1000 ha)     €/ha     # (1000 ha)     as per cent of GM rent
* 
                           
I  200    1.46m  173 (12.0)    103    36 (7.9)    50%  29%  22% 






acreage   50    0.16 m  13 (4.6)    49.99    5 (2.7)    78%  0%  22% 
                           
IV  200    12080  173    54    104    46%  36%  17% 





acreage    
(1 ha per 
respondent) 
50    411  13    43    6    62%  9%  29% 
                                        
* The GM rent is the area under the demand curves in Figure 1 and under equivalent demand curves for scenarios IV, V, and 
VI, respectively, assuming a zero GM fee. 
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Figures  
 

































Note that the first five values of each demand curve were set equal to the respective 
profit difference although the underlying willingness to pay exceeded the profit 
difference. 